Hearing Voices by Joseph, Anne M
Book Note
Hearing Voices
The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To Know?
By Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998. Pp. 282. $19.95.
In a 1996 Washington Post poll, an astoundingly low six percent of
Americans could name the Chief Justice of the United States,' and only
sixty percent of respondents could identify the Vice President.2 The
responses deeply trouble some. Without grasping such basic facts, how can
"the people" participate in a democratic system of government?3 But the
responses do not faze others. Voters, jurors, and even legislators may not
possess adequate information; yet, so long as they take cues from other
sources, they will likely make eminently reasonable decisions.4 In The
Democratic Dilemma,5 Lupia and McCubbins tease out this latter story of
reassurance-examining, in theory and in practice, how individuals decide
to follow or ignore particular sources of advice.
Lupia and McCubbins argue that uninformed citizens may use cues or
shortcuts such as opinion leaders, party identification, and the media in
their decisions. They are not, however, the first to do so.6 Rather, the
authors' main contribution to the contentious debate over citizen ignorance
1. This figure is presumably higher now in light of the impeachment trial of President
Clinton.
2. See Richard Cohen, Editorial, Ignorant, Apathetic and Smug, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996,
atAI9.
3. See ROBERT E. LANE & DAvID 0. SEARS, PUBLIC OPINION 116 (1964); Cohen, supra note
2, at A19. In the context of jury deliberations, Richard Posner argues that the Seventh Amendment
should be amended to allow judicial discretion for jury trials in civil cases. In particular, Posner
believes that jurors lack sufficient knowledge to comprehend complex civil litigation. See Richard
A. Posner, Juries on Trial, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 49.
4. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED To KNOW? (1998).
5. Il
6. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); KEITH
KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991).
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and its repercussions7 lies in their provision of needed theoretical analysis
of how and what people learn from cues. After analyzing how individuals
select which cues to believe, they apply their theoretical framework of
information and persuasion to assess the efficacy of a wide range of
institutional mechanisms in fostering trustworthy sources.
Mired in a theory that examines only individual choices between two
options, the authors show how individuals, faced with incomplete
information, may draw rationally on cues to satisfy given preferences. This
may be reassuring in many circumstances. These references to cues-while
rational for individuals-may impose, however, external costs, from the
inability of cues to form or change individuals' preferences to stunted
deliberation among individuals.
Culling from economics, cognitive science, psychology, and political
theory, Lupia and McCubbins first advance a multi-part theory to explain
how "the people" (classified as voters, legislators, and jurors) make decent
choices. They then present a series of experiments to buttress their formal
model before briefly commenting on how institutions can be structured to
encourage persuasive, but not deceptive, cues to uninformed citizens.
In narrative form,' the theory---detailing the "specific conditions under
which people who have limited information can make reasoned
choices" 9 is compelling. Lupia and McCubbins presume that individuals
do not have sufficient relevant information to make educated judgments.
The authors contend, however, that individuals need not possess full
information to choose wisely. Even when they are unable to pay attention to
information, individuals substitute the advice of others. Acquiring this
advice is problematic since there is a tradeoff between the costs of
acquiring information and the risk of being deceived by others. Institutions
7. The literature on citizen ignorance and its consequences is vast. Philip Converse's seminal
contribution examines what Americans know and analyzes whether they structure their beliefs in
any coherent way. See Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964). Responding to Converse's
depressing assessment of the American voter, Nie and others argue that voters may lack
information, but that they use shortcuts to make decisions. See NORMAN H. NIE Er AL., THE
CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1976). This revisionist argument has gained some converts, but
many are still convinced by Converse and later studies. See, e.g., ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE
UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989) (arguing that voters still do not possess much relevant
information). Many scholars, journalists, and pundits have fueled the debate by conducting
surveys and analyzing the repercussions of the results. For a solid survey of recent work, see
MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND
WHY IT MATrERS (1996).
8. The mathematical translation of their formal theoretical model is smartly ensconced in
appendices. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 4, at 233-60.
9. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
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may mitigate this tradeoff by structuring, through penalties and rewards, the
incentives of those who provide advice to align with the objectives of
individuals seeking advice.
According to Lupia and McCubbins, this process of learning from
others can result in one of three outcomes: (1) enlightenment; (2) deception;
or (3) lack of any learning.10 The first two outcomes mandate that the
listener (to advice) be persuaded." Persuasion requires the perception that
the speaker (the one doling out the advice) both possesses the needed
information and is trustworthy.' 2 Rather than depending on Aristotelian
notions of personal connection and character assessment for persuasion, 3
Lupia and McCubbins rely on the presence or absence of institutional
structures, which they term "incentive-altering external forces":
mechanisms of verification, penalties for lying, and the ability to observe
costly efforts.' 4 For example, jurors, who enter a trial uninformed about the
case, are likely to believe witnesses whom they do not even know. Lawyers
verify or undermine witness testimony through cross-examination, and
witnesses may face prosecution for perjury if they lie under oath. 5 These
external credibility mechanisms help encourage listeners to perceive
common interests.'
6
The authors build their theory through a technical model, accompanied
by diagrams and mathematical proofs. They modify Crawford and Sobel's
"cheap talk" model-that because talk is truly cheap, people cannot
deceive each other-to examine who can persuade a stranger, and
furthermore, how external mechanisms help determine who can convince a
stranger. 7 In their modified model, an individual faces a binary choice
between option x and option y and decides which option to take after
listening to a speaker. There are three levels of uncertainty: (1) whether
option x is better than option y; (2) whether the speaker knows whether
option x is better than option y; and (3) whether the speaker has similar or
opposing interests to the individual.' Absent external mechanisms, an
individual must perceive both common interests and speaker knowledge to
10. See id at 8.
II. "When we learn nothing, our beliefs go unchanged and we gain no knowledge." l
12. See id. at 50-51. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for the advice giver actually to
possess knowledge to persuade listeners. Likewise, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
advice giver and listeners actually to share the same interests for listeners to be persuaded. See id.
at 51.
13. See id. at 42.
14. Id. at 42, 53-54.
15. See id. at 223-25.
16. See id. at 54-55.
17. See id. at 45. Crawford and Sobel's model shows that people cannot be deceived in
equilibrium when there are no credible mechanisms to prove statements-in other words, when
there is cheap talk. See Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982).
18. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 4, at 45-49.
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be persuaded by the speaker.19 As external forces increase, there is less need
20for perceived common interests to achieve persuasion. In their model, an
individual may be deceived if she cannot learn about a persuasive and
knowledgeable speaker's incentives.2 ' Applying this theory to types of cues
considered in debates over citizen ignorance, Lupia and McCubbins argue
that " [c]oncepts like reputation, party, or ideology are useful heuristics only
if they convey information about knowledge and trust. The converse of this
statement is not true." 22
To test their formal theory, Lupia and McCubbins contributed to the
discretionary income of a considerable number of their university's
undergraduates. Most tests consisted of two students, one "speaker" and
one "decision-maker," and involved a coin toss that the decisionmaker did
not witness and about which the decisionmaker needed information to
receive a payoff.2 3 Although Lupia and McCubbins's coin flip experiments
do not directly address voter choice, legislative policymaking, or jury
deliberation, the experiments do provide a tremendous amount of data to
support their model. In addition to cataloguing all the possible permutations
of the coin flip studies, Lupia and McCubbins also conducted an
experiment on persuasion by surveying almost 1500 citizens by telephone.
Respondents were asked whether they thought it was a good or bad idea to
spend money to build more prisons. Some subjects were told whether Phil
Donahue or Rush Limbaugh endorsed a particular view on the issue.24 As
predicted by their theory, as respondents' perceptions of knowledge and
trustworthiness of the talk show hosts increased, respondents were more
likely to match the "endorsed" view.' When respondents did not agree
with the endorser's views but when respondents thought the endorser was
knowledgeable, learning that the source believed x compelled some
respondents to believe not x. 26
In reflecting on their theory and its empirical validation, Lupia and
McCubbins consider a variety of "electoral, legislative, bureaucratic, and
19. See id. at 50.
20. See id. at 55.
21. See id. at 70-74.
22. Id. at 64 (emphasis omitted).
23. In many of their experiments, there were two "players": a principal and a speaker. The
principal had to "guess" the outcome of a coin toss that she never witnessed. The speaker stated
whether heads or tails was a better prediction. The principal's payoff was linked to the accuracy of
the choice. The speaker's payoff varied, so that the authors could test the effect of common and
conflicting interests. See id. at 101-02. Within this simple framework, the authors tested the effect
of different variables such as speaker knowledge, compatibility of speaker and decisionmaker
incentives, and external incentive mechanisms (i.e., penalty for lying, verification, and costly
effort) on reasoned choice. See id. at 114. The authors also conducted a separate set of
experiments on delegation, involving a principal, agent, and speaker. See id. at 149-83.
24. See id. at 186-88.
25. See id. at 191-94.
26. See id. at 194.
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judicial institutions" and analyze, to a limited extent, whether these
institutions are designed to promote reasoned choices.27 For example, they
argue that legislators wisely delegate policymaking to bureaucrats after
screening potential agency heads in the appointment process and enacting
rules to constrain agency action.' s By contrast, they suggest that certain
institutions, such as term limits for California's state legislators, undermine
the transmission of knowledge: With fewer incumbents, there is typically
less of a public record, leaving voters with little to no information on new
candidates for office.29
Lupia and McCubbins present a compelling and empirically supported
model illustrating how uninformed individuals can make reasoned
decisions. Based on this simple model, Lupia and McCubbins conclude that
institutions that encourage reasoned choices "mitigate the democratic
dilemma."3" Is this confidence warranted? Models necessarily entail
simplification. From a set of basic assumptions, a model can generate
testable predictions. If these predictions are empirically verified, we may
feel more confident about the underlying theory. Rational individual action
may not by itself, however, necessarily be socially optimal. If individual
actions in a market for information generate external costs, these
externalities may lead us to worry about the level of "ignorance" and cue
taking we do see.
II
Individuals make an incredible number of choices, from purchasing an
automobile to voting for Governor, often without personal knowledge of
the options. In an effort to make a more informed decision, an individual
may seek cues from the public domain, such as recommendations of
Consumer Reports before buying a new car or the endorsement of her daily
newspaper before casting her ballot. Reliance on Consumer Reports does
not seem threatening. An individual reading only the election editorial is
more disconcerting because the editorial may not enhance her ability to
discuss social and economic issues in any meaningful manner. In this way,
cue taking may be rational for an individual, but it is not always optimal for
society.
Because there are occasions in which cue taking is both individually
rational and socially reassuring, the theoretical framework and empirical
validation offered by Lupia and McCubbins make a substantial and
provocative contribution to the debate over citizen ignorance. When
27. See id. at 205.
28. See id. at 216-19.
29. See id. at 225-26.
30. Iti at 227.
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citizens face a simple binary choice (heads or tails, Toyota or Honda, build
more prisons or not build more prisons), informational cues from outside
sources can assist citizens in making reasonable decisions. In a study of
California ballot initiatives, voters who knew whether the insurance
industry had endorsed an initiative were more likely to vote in a manner
consistent with their economic objectives.3"
Lupia and McCubbins's theory does have, nevertheless, some
potentially disconcerting undertones. First, their framework limits decisions
to binary choices. Yet, legal decisions, for instance, are becoming
exceedingly complex. Reliance on simple cues may not be sufficient when
individuals are faced with complicated choices. Second, institutions
providing cues may promote the primitiveness of decisions that confront
individuals and, furthermore, may not reflect the negative social
externalities imposed by individuals' rational ignorance.
The types of choices that voters, legislators, and jurors must make are
not always binary ones. Lupia and McCubbins's limited discussion of
judicial institutions constructs jurors as making a simple determination of
guilt or innocence. Jurors are not knowledgeable about the case they are to
adjudicate but rely instead on the adversarial process to attach biases to
witnesses and read signals as to how they should render their decision."
Nevertheless, with increasingly complex litigation, their decision may not
consist of selecting one of two options.
In Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.,33 an environmental mass torts case
recounted in A Civil Action, jurors had to answer a set of four complicated
questions in the first, and, ultimately, the only phase of the trial, involving
whether particular chemicals had contaminated two drinking water wells
and if so, on which dates the chemicals began to contaminate the wells. 4
Such complicated questions do not fit neatly into Lupia and McCubbins's
model of how individuals select among binary choices. These jurors had to
determine dates of actions, not merely their existence or absence. It is
perhaps no surprise that the jurors said they could not determine many dates
and even returned a random date for one of the questions.35
Even presuming that many choices are binary, the selection process
among options may yield unexpected or costly results. If choices are
sufficiently simple and reliable cues exist, why would individuals spend
more time investing in information? For the authors, "[t]he mismatch
between what delegation demands and citizens' capabilities constitutes the
31. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 63 (1994).
32. See LuPIA & McCUBBINS, supra note 4, at 223-25.
33. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
34. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIi ACTION 368-69 (1995).
35. See id. at 392.
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democratic dilemma."36 There is little mismatch so long as delegation
demands selections from binary choices and cue sources provide
information. I wonder, however, if the democratic dilemma is rather this
self-reinforcing cycle--citizens' lack of knowledge has limited what we
demand from delegation and democracy, and our limited demands
encourage rational ignorance.
In some circumstances, moreover, rational ignorance may generate
social costs. Given that individuals obviously cannot pay attention to
everything, Lupia and McCubbins argue that individuals assess whether the
expected benefits to paying attention outweigh the expected opportunity
and transaction costs. 7 Imagine an individual voter is deciding whether to
read the newspaper coverage over several weeks of an upcoming election or
to rely on the endorsement by the editorial staff. Imagine further than the
voter will choose to vote for the same candidate in either scenario. The
opportunity and transaction costs are higher if the 'voter reads the
newspaper. If the voter's benefits derive solely from the choice of
candidate, the rational voter would rely on the endorsement. There are
presumably, however, external benefits to following the newspaper
coverage. The voter may be more able and willing to discuss current
political and social issues. Any discussion among voters who read the
newspaper should be richer than discussion among voters who only know
which candidate the newspaper endorsed.
This focus on individual decisionmaking underplays the necessity of
deliberation among individuals for many decisions." In many binary
choices, such as selecting between a Toyota and a Honda automobile, we
may not be concerned that in Lupia and McCubbins's theory, individuals'
preferences are determined by some external source. But what if individuals
do not hold well-defined interests regarding, for example, race relations?
What if they hold defined interests that would change if they were forced to
discuss them? 9
For two of the three institutions Lupia and McCubbins claim to address
in their theory-the jury and the legislature-they do not discuss in any
36. LupIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 4, at 12.
37. They define the "calculus of attention" as E(Retum)=E(Benefit)-E(Opportunity Costs)-
E(Transaction Costs). See id. at 25.
38. See AMY GUTLMNN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 224
(1996) (arguing that deliberation plays a part in discovering "morally better decisions and morally
better ways io conduct the democratic process"). Deliberation may improve outcomes, but it may
also provide confidence to democratic participants. See id. at 229. Deliberation may, in some
cases, only be symbolic, but the symbolic role may have value. See Bernard Grofman, Public
Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice"
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1551 (1993).
39. Individuals may hold onto preferences out of habit, rather than through any systematic
evaluation of the various options. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION
OF RATIONALITY 120-21 (1983).
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detail the role of deliberation even though both juries and legislatures
engage in group decisionmaking. Moreover, while Lupia and McCubbins
consider deliberation for voters, they summarily dismiss it:
Another, and more general, idea for improving modem democracy
is to encourage ordinary citizens to deliberate on political matters.
The idea behind this proposal is that citizens who deliberate will
enlighten one another and vastly improve political decision making.
... The mere construction of a deliberative setting does not
guarantee that the cream of the collective's knowledge will rise to
the top and be spread evenly across the group. °
The authors are correct that deliberation, within their market for
information, does not guarantee "enlightenment." For it is within their
market for information that individuals will not consider external
repercussions, including the quality of group deliberation, when deciding
whether to obtain information or rely on cues. Although citizens may
indeed learn, according to The Democratic Dilemma's subtitle "what they
need to know," they may not learn what our democratic institutions need
them to know.
-Anne M. Joseph
40. LuPLA & McCUBBINS, supra note 4, at 226-27 (internal citations omitted).
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